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Introduction 
There is a clear nexus between a nation’s educational outcomes and its economic growth rate. 
However, it is not educational attainment per se but rather what students actually know—as 
measured by international standardized tests—that is important for economic growth (see 
Fuchs and Wößmann 2007; Hanushek and Wößmann 2011 for reviews). Relatively small 
improvements in cognitive skill levels can therefore translate into substantial improvements 
in a population’s future well-being (Hanushek and Kimko 2000; OECD 2010a). This 
distinction between the quality versus quantity of education is critical because policies 
designed to increase educational attainment may not be the same ones that improve student 
achievement. It is perhaps not surprising then that researchers are increasingly turning to 
cross-country analyses of standardized cognitive-skills tests to understand which educational 
policies and which institutional arrangements lead to the best student outcomes (e.g., Bishop 
1997; de Heus and Dronkers 2010; Fuchs and Wößmann 2007; Hanushek and Wößmann 
2011; Schneeweis 2010; Schütz et al. 2005; 2007; Van de Werfhorst and Mijs 2010).  
 Against this backdrop, there are several reasons to be concerned about the tendency 
for migrants in many countries to underperform on cognitive-skills tests.i First, successful 
integration into the educational system is a particularly salient issue for the millions of 
children growing up in migrant families. Many European countries are experiencing serious 
problems in integrating migrants and their children (see Algan et al. 2010), while the U.S. 
educational system is struggling to cope with a sharp increase in the proportion of students 
who are “English Language Learners” (Fix and Capps 2005). Second, educational disparities 
tend to persist across generations, which can severely limit intergenerational income mobility 
(see Solon 2004; d’Addio 2007). Thus, the long-term economic and social integration of 
migrant communities is directly linked to their ability to make effective human capital 
investments and to pass these investments on to future generations. Finally, economic growth 
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rates will be lower—and improvements in living standards slower—if education systems 
within host countries are not effective in fully developing the skills and talents of migrant 
children.  
 This paper contributes to this emerging literature on the role of education policies 
and institutions in student achievement by carefully analyzing cross-national differences in 
the nativity gap in cognitive-test scores.ii Our objective is to understand which education 
systems, policies, and institutions are most effective in promoting the cognitive development 
and educational integration of migrant youths. To this end, we take advantage of Programme 
for International Student Assessment (PISA) data for 2009 that provide us with standardized 
math, science and language test scores for migrant and native-born students nearing the end 
of compulsory schooling across a range of countries. The PISA data are designed to measure 
broad competencies rather than understanding of the specific school curriculum, and are 
therefore useful in understanding the extent to which students have acquired the knowledge 
and skills that are essential in adulthood.  
 We conduct separate analyses for those migrant students who do and those who do 
not speak the host-country language at home, in order to account for the critical role of 
language in the formation of cognitive skills. Students with a migration background are also 
differentiated by their age at migration in order to account for the point at which they entered 
the host-country educational system. We then utilize a number of macro indicators capturing 
the nature of immigration policy and educational systems within each host country to shed 
light on the policies and institutional arrangements that are most effective in facilitating the 
educational integration of migrant youths.  
 Our focus on migrant youths’ age at migration is fundamental to developing a deeper 
understanding of the pathways through which educational institutions matter and of the 
critical importance of language skills in achieving the educational integration of migrant 
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children. At its most basic level, age at migration drives the combination of educational 
institutions to which children are exposed. Children arriving after age five, for example, miss 
out on any benefits associated with attending preschool in the host country. Those arriving 
during their high school years do not receive the intensive instruction in numeracy and 
literacy skills that they would have received in primary school. These gaps are important, as 
many researchers have argued that proficiency in the national language is critical if children 
with a migration background are to close the cognitive-skills gap vis-à-vis other children (for 
example, Dustmann, et al. 2011; Schneeweis 2010). There appears to be a critical age—
consistent with critical periods in language acquisition—beyond which child migrants face a 
much greater risk of not completing high school (Corak 2012; Beck et al. 2012). Similarly, 
Washbrook et al. (2011) argue that cross-country differences in cognitive outcomes during 
the teen years have their roots in vocabulary deficits in early childhood, which are either 
ameliorated or amplified by public policy in the intervening years. The strength of these 
public policy effects almost certainly rests on the length of time children are exposed to them. 
Finally, differentiating migrant children by their age at arrival is useful in identifying why 
some educational institutions appear to have heterogeneous effects on children from different 
backgrounds (see Ammermüller 2005; Schneeweis 2010; Van de Werfhorst and Mijs 2010; 
Washbrook et al. 2011).  
 We find that achievement gaps are larger for migrant youths who arrive at older ages 
and for those who do not speak the test language at home.iii Institutional arrangements often 
serve to mitigate the achievement gaps of some migrant students while leaving unaffected or 
exacerbating those of others. For example, earlier school starting ages help migrant youths in 
some cases but by no means in all. Limited tracking on ability appears beneficial for 
migrants’ relative achievement, while complete tracking and a large private school sector 
appear detrimental. Migrant students’ achievement relative to their native-born peers suffers 
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as educational spending and teachers’ salaries increase, but improves when examination is a 
component of the process for evaluating teachers. 
 In Section 2, we discuss the link between educational institutions and the relative 
achievement of students with a migration background. The details of the PISA data, 
estimation sample, achievement test scores, and institutional measures are presented in 
Section 3. Our estimation approach is outlined in Section 4. Section 5 documents the 
association between age at migration, the language spoken at home and institutional 
arrangements on the one hand, and the nativity gap in student achievement on the other. 
Finally, our conclusions and suggestions for future research are discussed in Section 6. 
Educational Integration: Which Institutions Matter? 
Institutional arrangements matter for economic and social outcomes because they set the 
incentives for economic agents and define the constraints under which they will operate. In 
their review of prior studies, Fuchs and Wößmann (2007) identify several key features of 
educational systems that have been theorized to impact on the quality of education. These 
include: (1) the balance of public versus private financing and provision; (2) the 
centralization of financing; (3) external versus teacher-based standards and examinations; (4) 
centralization versus school autonomy in curricular, budgetary and personnel decisions; and 
(5) performance-based incentive contracts.iv  
 Cross-national studies of students’ performance on standardized, cognitive-skills tests 
confirm that the institutional arrangements underpinning educational systems have major 
implications for both student achievement and the degree of intergenerational persistence in 
educational attainment. Curriculum-based external exit exams are associated with improved 
student achievement (Bishop 1997), for example. In general, student performance appears to 
be enhanced by a combination of (1) centralization of examinations and control mechanisms; 
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(2) school and teacher autonomy (over hiring, teaching methods, etc.); (3) limitations on 
teachers’ unions; and (4) competition from private schools (Schütz et al. 2007; Wößmann 
2007). Moreover, intergenerational mobility in educational attainment is promoted by earlier 
school starting ages and later tracking on ability (Bauer and Riphahn 2007; 2009). Together 
these results imply that that the way we choose to organize and fund schools has profound 
implications for economic growth, living standards, intergenerational equity, and social 
justice.  
 Researchers have turned their attention to understanding the ways that international 
differences in the organization of educational systems affect the educational achievement of 
migrant children specifically. Schools do not appear to function equally well for immigrant 
and native children. In Germany, for example, the children of immigrants and foreigners 
receive less education, are on less favorable education tracks, and have increasing difficulty 
in accessing vocational training (Gang and Zimmerman 2000; Frick and Wagner 2000). 
Educational attainment is also lower among immigrant youths in the Netherlands (Van Ours 
and Veenman 2003) and Denmark (Nielsen et al. 2003), while immigrant youths have an 
educational advantage in Canada (Aydemir et al. 2008) and Australia (Cobb-Clark and 
Nguyen 2010). Not surprisingly, the educational achievement of migrant children is closely 
tied to the educational background of their parents (see Dustmann et al. 2011), leaving 
selective immigration policy a major driver of cross-national differences in migrant 
children’s relative educational achievement.  
 At the same time, researchers are working hard to find the link between educational 
outcomes for immigrant youths and the institutional design of national education systems 
themselves. Nolan (2009), for example, argues that second-generation youths achieve better 
educational outcomes in countries in which (1) there is a large tertiary sectorv with easy 
access to higher education; (2) face-to-face contact is greater in terms of time; (3) the 
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emphasis on homework is lower; and (4) more resources are provided for youths with 
learning problems, particularly language difficulties. Similarly, Schneeweis (2010) finds that 
the educational integration of migrant children is facilitated by preschool education, increased 
hours of instruction, and, at least for science, central (rather than local) examination of 
student outcomes.  
 There is little doubt that language acquisition is essential to children’s educational 
achievement. In particular, literacy skills are the bedrock for building competency in math, 
science, social studies, etc. Many migrant children face an extra hurdle as they work to 
develop their skills in not one but two languages. It is perhaps not surprising that migrant 
children who speak the host-country language at home generally have an educational 
advantage over those who do not (e.g., Dustmann et al. 2011; Schneeweis 2010; Washbrook 
et al. 2011).  
 Economists studying the production of cognitive skills have begun to draw on the 
insights from developmental psychology, and they increasingly model cognitive achievement 
as a process that is cumulative, dependent on parents’ and schools’ investments, and sensitive 
to critical periods in a child’s development (e.g. Cunha and Heckman 2008; Cunha et al. 
2010; Todd and Wolpin 2003; 2006). Insights from this emerging literature are especially 
important for understanding migrant children’s educational outcomes. In particular, Corak 
(2012) notes that second-language acquisition is firmly rooted in the idea of “critical” 
periods. Although the exact age at which any critical period might occur is subject to debate, 
“in general second-language competencies deteriorate for immigrants with age at arrival” 
(Corak 2012, 8).vi This raises the possibility that critical periods in children’s language 
development may manifest themselves as critical periods in other domains. In particular, 
children migrating to Canada or the United States after age nine have a substantially higher 
risk of not completing high school, which has important consequences for integration into 
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host-country society (Beck et al. 2012; Corak 2012). These differences in the migration 
experiences of children make it vital to focus specifically on children’s ages at migration 
when assessing their educational integration.  
 Literacy skills are not only critical for the development of competency in other 
areas, but they are also central to measuring both cognitive skills and academic achievement. 
Success on standardized achievement tests like PISA, for example, relies heavily on the 
ability to read and write, making it difficult to separate language proficiency from overall 
academic ability. Akresh and Akresh (2010) find that the foreign-born children of Hispanic 
immigrants who were randomly allowed to take a standard language achievement test in 
Spanish scored substantially higher than their peers who took the test in English. U.S.-born 
children of Hispanic immigrants, on the other hand, did significantly better if they were 
randomly assigned to take the test in English rather than Spanish. The authors conclude that a 
substantial portion of the Hispanic-white test gap in math and reading can be explained by 
test-score language bias. Similarly Washbrook et al. (2011) find that the young children of 
immigrants underperform in vocabulary tests despite exhibiting no differences in behavior or 
in nonverbal cognitive skills. Taken together, these results suggest that achievement tests and 
other cognitive skill measures, which are heavily reliant on literacy skills, may present a 
distorted picture of migrant children’s overall competency. Unfortunately, this may have 
long-term consequences, as children who score poorly on achievement tests are often tracked 
into lower-level classes or less selective secondary schools (see Akresh and Akresh 2010).  
 Finally, it is important to note that host-country educational systems and social 
policy institutions may either accentuate or mitigate the particular challenges that migrant 
children face. Migrant children seem to fare better in English-speaking countries like 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, particularly 
when they have strong English language skills (e.g. Schneeweis 2010; Dustmann et al. 
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2011).vii It is difficult to know whether this occurs because English has emerged as a 
dominant international language or because these countries have long histories of receiving—
and therefore integrating—immigrants. The disparity in educational integration within 
English-speaking countries strongly suggests that immigration policy also plays an important 
role. Australia, and to a lesser extent Canada, explicitly select immigrants on the basis of their 
educational qualifications and language skills. Children with a migration background in these 
countries have parents who are generally highly educated and speak the national language at 
home—advantages that are reflected in the vocabulary test scores of very young migrant 
children (Washbrook et al. 2011).  
Data  
OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA)viii 
The OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is an internationally 
standardized assessment that was jointly developed by participating countries and 
administered to 15-year-olds in schools. The survey was administered in 43 countries in 2000 
(first cycle), 41 countries in 2003 (second cycle), 57 countries in 2006 (third cycle), and 67 
countries in 2009 (fourth cycle). In each country, tests are typically administered to between 
4,500 and 10,000 students from at least 150 schools (OECD 2009).ix PISA assesses the extent 
to which students near the end of compulsory education have acquired the knowledge and 
skills that are essential for full participation in society. In all cycles, reading, mathematics and 
science are covered not merely in terms of mastery of the school curriculum but in terms of 
important knowledge and skills needed in adult life. 
Each student takes a two-hour handwritten test. The test include multiple-choice items 
and questions that require students to construct their own responses. The items are organized 
in groups based on a passage setting out a real-life situation. In total there are six and a half 
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hours of assessment material, but each student is not tested on all the parts. Following the 
cognitive test, students also answer a background questionnaire that takes 20 to 30 minutes to 
complete and provides information about themselves and their homes. Finally, school 
principals are given a 20-minute questionnaire about their schools. 
In this paper, we examine data from the most recent cycle of PISA undertaken in 
2009. As in the initial cycle, the 2009 PISA focuses on reading literacy. We present results 
for this domain along with those for mathematics and scientific literacy. Because we are 
concerned with the role of immigration policies and educational institutions in explaining the 
relative performance of migrant youths, we restricted our analysis to OECD countries in 
order to eliminate sharp differences in political institutions or level of development.x 
Analysis Sample 
We further restrict our analysis sample by dropping a small number of students (841 out of an 
initial sample of 298,454) who lack information on age, gender, or school grade. We also 
drop 6,131 students who lack country-of-birth information or who do not have country-of-
birth information for at least one parent. Finally, we drop 2,372 students who are foreign-
born but have no foreign-born parents, as they are likely to be a particularly 
nonrepresentative group. We then classify all remaining students into the following three 
groups: (1) native-born: those born in the country where the test was given who have no 
foreign-born parents; (2) first-generation migrant: those not born in the country where the test 
was given who have at least one foreign-born parent; and (3) second-generation migrant: 
those born in the country where the test was given who have at least one foreign-born parent.  
First-generation migrant youths are then further classified into three groups based on 
their age at arrival: up to 4, 5–10, and 11–15. These age groups are chosen to correspond to 
the major school transition ages in most OECD countries. Because age at arrival is missing 
for 1,054 first-generation migrants, we are forced to drop these from the sample.xi These 
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restrictions result in a sample of 238,023 native-born, 14,818 first-generation migrant and 
35,215 second-generation migrant students across 34 OECD countries.  
Table 1 describes our final analysis sample. Sample sizes range from 3,451 for 
Iceland to 36,829 for Mexico, with a total sample size of 288,056. Overall, 82.6 percent of 
students are native-born, 5.1 percent are first-generation migrants and 12.2 percent are 
second-generation migrants. Among the OECD countries, Luxembourg has the largest 
proportion of first- and second-generation migrants, at 57 percent, followed by Australia and 
Switzerland at 42 percent and New Zealand at 41 percent. Korea has the smallest proportion 
of migrants at 0.3 percent, followed by Poland at 0.6 percent and Japan at 1.1 percent.  
Table 1 about here 
Measuring PISA Test Scores 
PISA includes five plausible values for each test score based on random numbers drawn from 
the distribution of scores that could be reasonably assigned to each individual, that is, the 
marginal posterior distribution. This is a statistical method for recognizing that a student’s 
performance on any individual assessment is somewhat random (see Adams and Wu 2002 for 
technical details). We derive mean test scores by averaging the plausible values in the data. 
The test scores are standardized across countries so that scores in each domain have a mean 
of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. In our regression analysis, we restandardize test 
scores in each domain to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1 across our 
analysis sample in order to facilitate the interpretation of regression coefficients, which now 
represent standard deviation changes in the outcome of interest. 
Table 2 presents the distribution of these test scores across countries by nativity and, 
for migrants, by language spoken at home. The results reveal that native-born students have 
considerably higher test scores than both first- and second-generation migrants in most 
countries, particularly when migrants do not speak the test language at home. That said, there 
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are a few countries, specifically Australia, Hungary, Turkey, where it is only first-generation 
migrant youths not speaking the test language at home who do not outperform native-born 
youths, and others like Canada where the nativity achievement gap is relatively small across 
the board. Test score gaps are generally similar across the three domains. 
Table 2 about here 
Measuring Educational Institutions 
Our objective is to understand how institutional arrangements affect the nativity achievement 
gap across countries. We pay particular attention to the way educational systems are 
organized, because the design of education policies may affect the performance of native-
born and migrant youths differently. In addition, we control for variations in economic and 
demographic characteristics that are associated with the size and educational composition of 
immigrant populations and that may determine the educational achievement of migrant 
youths. In our analysis, the effect of institutional arrangements on educational achievement is 
captured through the inclusion of a series of country-level variables describing the education 
system in our regression model. These variables were generated using external country-level 
data. 
 Specifically, we generate variables for the primary school starting age (in years), the 
total duration of primary and secondary education (in years), and public spending on 
education as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), using data from the 2011 World 
Development Indicators and Global Development Finance Databank of the World Bank. We 
also generate the proportion of students in upper secondary education enrolled in public 
schools and average teachers’ salaries (lower secondary education) after 15 years of 
experience/minimum training (in equivalent U.S. dollars adjusted for purchasing power 
parity, or PPP) using data from OECD (2010b). To obtain a measure of the relative income 
position of teachers, we divide their salaries by real GDP per capita (based on PPPs) using 
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data from the World Economic Outlook database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
We further use data from OECD (2007) to generate the age at which students are first tracked 
(selected) on ability in the education system, the existence of standards-based external 
examinations, and the percentages of students in schools in which the principal reported that 
achievement data were being used to evaluate teachers’ performance and there was ability 
grouping for some or all subjects.  
In addition to this set of variables describing educational systems, we also control for 
a country’s economic and demographic characteristics by including the number of 
immigrants as a percentage of the national population (using data from the United Nations 
2005; 2006), the Gini coefficient on income (using data from the World Bank Development 
Research Group and Statistics Iceland), and the logarithm of the GDP per capita measure 
mentioned above. Table 1 of the appendix shows how institutional arrangements vary by 
country. 
These are of course not the only features of educational systems that might be of 
interest. In particular, we are not accounting for diversity within schools or the way that 
children are allocated to schools. Diversity measures are notoriously difficult to calculate and 
interpret. Our more parsimonious specification allows us to focus on the substantive 
differences in institutional arrangements. 
The Estimation Model 
Our empirical analysis of students’ test scores begins with a linear regression model of the 
following form: 
 1 2 3 4
                    1,..., ,       1,...., ,      1,...., ,
isc o isc isc isc isc c iscT M A E X
i N s S c C
β β β β β α ε= + + + + + +
= = =
 (1) 
where T is the reading, math or science test score of student i in school s of country c. M 
includes four population indicators that identify our three groups of first-generation migrants 
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(i.e. those migrating at up to age four, age 5–10, and age 11–15) and the group of second-
generation migrants. Additionally, M includes interactions between these four population 
indicators and an indicator variable for whether or not the student speaks the test language in 
a particular country at home. In other words, there are a total of eight migrant groups whose 
outcomes are then compared to those for native-born youths.  
 Our estimation model also includes a set of age (measured in months) and gender 
indicators (A). Moreover, we account for the effects of immigrant selection across countries 
by controlling for variables related to immigrant parents (E). Specifically, E contains the 
highest parental education in years, a variable indicating whether parental education is 
missing or not, and an indicator for whether or not migrant youths have two (versus one) 
foreign-born parents. We also include a vector of additional individual-specific control 
variables denoting the household composition, occupational status and employment status of 
the parents, home possessions, home educational resources, home computer possession, 
cultural possessions and the number of books at home (X).  
 Our regression model also includes country-specific fixed effects (αc). These capture 
the direct impact of country-specific institutional arrangements on overall educational 
achievement in each country as well as any remaining country-specific factors that influence 
test scores for both native-born and migrant youths. We refer to equation (1) as our baseline 
model. In order to gauge the sensitivity of our results to alternative sets of controls, we also 
present and discuss the results of more parsimonious models in Section 5.1. 
 Our baseline model is useful in helping us understand the nativity achievement gap in 
OECD countries between students with the same demographic characteristics, family 
background, and home environment. It does nothing to shed light on the role of institutional 
arrangements in facilitating (or hindering) migrant students’ relative academic achievement 
because any effects of host-country institutions are subsumed in the country-specific fixed 
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effects. It is not possible to account for the effect of institutions on overall student 
achievement by adding country-level institutional controls directly to equation (1), since 
these controls would be perfectly collinear with the country-specific fixed effects. We can, 
however, account for the role of institutions in influencing the relative achievement of native-
born and migrant students. Specifically, we estimate the following model: 
 1 2 3 4 5
                    1,..., ,       1,...., ,      1,...., ,
isc o isc isc isc isc isc c c iscT M A E X M I
i N s S c C
β β β β β β α ε= + + + + + + +
= = =
 (2) 
where our country-level variables describing immigration policy and the education system 
are captured by the variable vector I. We interact the full set of country-level variables with 
our population indicators (M), with native-born youth as the omitted category. Hence, the 
coefficients in the vector β5 are interpreted as the differential impact that each country-level 
characteristic has on test scores for migrant students arriving at different ages and with 
different languages spoken at home relative to the impact each characteristic has on test 
scores for native-born students. We refer to equation (2) as our full model. Selected results 
from this model are presented and discussed in Section 5.2. 
 Hanushek and Wößmann (2011) argue that the main challenge in identifying the 
causal effects of host-country institutions on educational outcomes is the likely presence of 
unobserved country-specific effects that are correlated with student achievement. In principle, 
this problem can be overcome with the inclusion of country-specific fixed effects, as we have 
done in equations (1) and (2). At the same time, we believe that an equally challenging 
problem results from the fact that policy formation itself is almost certainly endogenous. That 
is, educational policy typically changes in response to a perceived shortcoming in student 
achievement rather than exogenously. There is no straightforward solution to this 
endogeneity problem when relying upon observational data. Thus, we interpret our estimates 
as descriptive rather than causal.  
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Results 
The Nativity Test-Score Gap and Age at Migration 
Baseline estimates of the average nativity test-score gap by migrants’ age at migration and 
language spoken at home are presented in Table 3. We consider three alternative 
specifications, each increasing in controls, as follows: (1) Specification A controls only for 
students’ gender, students’ age at the time they took the test, and country-specific fixed 
effects; (2) Specification B adds the controls for parents’ education (E); and (3) Specification 
C is the baseline model given in equation (1). The first three columns capture the test-score 
gap between native-born youths on the one hand and first-generation migrant youths who 
speak the test language at home on the other hand. The next three columns reflect the test-
score gap for first-generation migrants not speaking the test language at home, while results 
for second-generation migrant youths are presented in the final two columns. Given the 
parameterization of PISA test scores (see above), all nativity achievement gaps are expressed 
in terms of standard deviations.  
Table 3 about here 
 When we control only for students’ gender and age and country fixed effects 
(Specification A), we find that, on average, student achievement gaps in OECD countries are 
wider for migrant youths who arrive at older ages and for those who do not speak the test 
language at home. In particular, migrant youths arriving in the host country at age four or 
younger have reading scores at age 15 that are 0.120 standard deviations lower than their 
native-born counterparts if they speak the test language at home and 0.225 standard 
deviations lower if they do not. The reading gap for second-generation students speaking the 
test language at home is smaller but still statistically significant (0.075 standard deviations), 
while the reading achievement gap for second-generation students not speaking the test 
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language at home is more than five times as large. All of these gaps are statistically 
significant. 
The nativity gap in reading achievement increases sharply with migrant youths’ ages 
at migration, whether or not the test language is spoken at home. In particular, the reading 
gap among youths who migrated in their primary-school years (ages 5–10) increases to 0.220 
standard deviations if they speak the test language at home and to 0.331 standard deviations if 
they do not. For those migrating during their high school years (ages 11–15), the reading 
achievement gap is larger still. Increased exposure to the host-country educational institutions 
is clearly associated with smaller gaps in reading achievement. This relationship between age 
at migration and relative reading achievement provides one potential explanation for the 
increased risk of dropping out of high school that is observed for those youths migrating after 
age nine (see Beck et al. 2012; Corak 2012). 
 Consistent with previous evidence (Dustmann et al. 2011; Schneeweis 2010; 
Washbrook et al. 2011), reading achievement gaps are much larger for youths who do not 
speak the test language at home: 0.747 standard deviations versus 0.310 if migrating after age 
10, for example. Importantly, these gaps persist into the second generation. In particular, 
second-generation migrant youths who do not speak the test language at home have a reading 
achievement gap that is similar in size to that of otherwise similar first-generation migrants 
who arrive during their primary-school years. 
 Nativity achievement gaps in math and science in OECD countries are strikingly 
similar to that in reading. In fact, only first-generation migrant youths arriving after age 10 
and not speaking the test language at home have reading achievement gaps (0.747 standard 
deviations) that are larger than their achievement gaps in math (0.553 standard deviations) 
and science (0.700 standard deviations). In almost all other cases, the nativity achievement 
gap is wider in math and science than it is in reading. It is difficult to know whether this 
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relative underperformance of migrant youths in math and science, however, reflects 
differences in academic achievement or language competency.xii Math and science 
achievement gaps also widen for youths who have less exposure to host-country educational 
institutions and fewer opportunities to speak the host-country language. As was the case for 
reading achievement, there remains a sizeable achievement gap in both math and science 
among second-generation students who do not speak the test language at home. 
The intergenerational persistence in educational achievement and attainment in 
OECD countries has been well documented (see d’Addio 2007). As immigrants in many 
OECD countries have less education than their native-born counterparts, it is not surprising 
then that the gaps in migrant youths’ reading, math, and science achievement all fall 
substantially once we account for their parents’ lower levels of education (Specification B). 
Achievement gaps across the three domains are virtually eliminated for first-generation 
migrants arriving before age 11 and for second-generation migrants once we account for 
parental education.xiii However, migrant youths who arrive at ages 11 through 15 continue to 
experience a gap in reading achievement at age 15 of 0.242–0.564 standard deviations. Gaps 
in math and science competency are similar. Interestingly, parental education does little to 
mitigate the penalty associated with very late migration. Those youth migrating at ages 11 
through 15 remain between a fifth and a half standard deviation behind their native-born 
peers whether or not we control for parental education. It is possible that this gap results from 
the limited exposure that these young people have had to host-country schools. At the same 
time, it is possible that there is a negative selection effect. Families may be prepared to 
migrate with adolescent children only if those children are not particularly academically 
oriented.  
 In addition to accounting for parental education, it is important to account for the 
extent to which young people’s families are able to support their human capital development. 
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To this end, our full model (Specification C) adds a number of controls that are designed to 
capture the effect of young people’s socio-economic background (e.g. parents’ occupational 
and employment status), household structure, and educational resources at home 
(possessions, books, computers, educational resources, etc.) on their reading, math, and 
science achievement.  
Accounting for young people’s family background often eliminates—and in some 
cases reverses—their achievement gaps. Immigrant youths arriving in the host country before 
age 11 are estimated to have significantly higher math achievement (approximately 0.15 
standard deviations) at age 15 than do their native-born peers. Only immigrant youth arriving 
in the host country during the four years before PISA tests are administered and not speaking 
the test language at home continue to have a significant gap in achievement levels: 0.142 
standard deviations (math) and 0.402 (reading). In virtually all other cases, accounting for the 
effect of family background in addition to parental income is sufficient to eliminate the 
nativity achievement gap.xiv 
 Overall, these results are consistent with the substantial international literature that 
demonstrates the importance of parental education and family resources in promoting 
children’s educational achievement. Much of the achievement gap experienced by immigrant 
youths in OECD countries is by and large the result of their relatively disadvantaged 
circumstances. At the same time, it is clear that the extent of the achievement gap narrows as 
youths gain more exposure to host-country schooling and have more opportunities to speak 
the test language. There is a substantial achievement penalty, particularly in reading, 
associated with delayed migration for those not speaking the test language at home, even 
after we account for the parental education and family background.  
The Nativity Test-Score Gap and Educational Institutions 
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We turn now to consider how the design of OECD countries’ educational systems is related 
to the relative educational achievement of migrant students. In Table 4 (reading), Table 5 
(math), and Table 6 (science), we present the estimated effects from a single regression 
model where each of our country-level educational controls is interacted with our population 
indicators (M*C). This allows us to assess whether specific institutional arrangements are 
associated with either an increased or a reduced nativity achievement gap in reading, math, or 
science. Although the coefficients are not presented here, the regression model in each case 
also controls for students’ demographic characteristics (A), parental education (E), family 
background effects (X) and country fixed effects (see equation (2). Finally, as before, the 
parameterization of the PISA test scores implies that all nativity achievement gaps are 
expressed in terms of standard deviations. Negative values imply that a particular institution 
is associated with lower achievement among migrant students relative to their native-born 
counterparts (i.e., migrant students are disadvantaged), while positive values imply the 
opposite. 
Tables 4 - 6 about here 
 Migrant students’ relative achievement at age 15 is related to the host-country’s 
school starting age. These effects, however, differ by the age at which migrant youths arrive 
and the specific domain under consideration. Migrant students’ relative achievement is not 
significantly different in school systems with early (i.e., age five and younger versus standard 
school starting ages (i.e., age six).xv Migrant students’ relative academic achievement often 
suffers, however, in educational systems with older school starting ages (i.e., age seven), 
particularly when they do not speak the test language at home. For example, first-generation 
migrant students who do not speak the test language at home experience an additional 
achievement penalty (relative to native-born students) for starting school late, on the order of 
0.2 to 0.3 standard deviations. This is perhaps not surprising in light of evidence that an 
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earlier school starting age facilitates intergenerational mobility in educational attainment 
(Bauer and Riphahn 2007; 2009). We might expect, then, that starting school at an older age 
would be especially problematic for youths who, like their parents, are themselves 
immigrants and do not have the advantage of speaking the test language at home.  
At the same time, the effect of school starting age on migrant students’ relative 
achievement varies in complex ways across achievement domains and with migrants’ age at 
arrival. The additional penalty associated with starting school late is largest in science, for 
example, for first-generation students who do not speak the language at home and who arrive 
young (0.308 standard deviations; see Table 6), while the largest penalty is in reading for 
those who arrive older (0.364 standard deviations; see Table 4). Starting school at older ages 
generally exposes first-generation migrants who speak the test language at home and arrive at 
age four or younger to an additional (relative to the native-born) achievement penalty, but 
gives those who arrive at ages 11 through 15 an additional achievement benefit. Finally, we 
find no significant effect of differences in the years of compulsory schooling on the relative 
reading, math, or science achievement of migrant students.xvi Taken together, these results 
indicate that additional exposure to host-country schooling benefits certain groups of migrant 
youth in some cases—as might be expected—but by no means in all.  
 The way that schools are organized and classes are formed may also affect migrant 
students’ relative performance. In particular, educators often argue that educational outcomes 
can be improved if students’ are tracked (streamed) on ability, yet the concern is that 
extensive tracking may disadvantage migrant students who may not have the same access to 
selective schools or enriched classes as their native-born peers.xvii Interestingly, we find that, 
across OECD countries as a whole, in many cases migrant students’ relative academic 
performance is positively (rather than negatively) related to the extent of ability tracking in 
the educational system. For example, earlier tracking on ability is associated with a small 
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improvement in the relative reading, math, and science achievement of first-generation 
migrant youths who arrive during their preschool years and speak the test language at 
home.xviii The same is true for first-generation migrant students arriving at ages 11 through 15 
who do not speak the test language at home. The fact that these two very different groups of 
migrant students both benefit from being in educational systems that track students earlier is 
interesting and may point to the importance of migrants’ having access to both remedial and 
extended instruction.xix  
Importantly, however, while some ability tracking (relative to no ability tracking) has 
additional achievement benefits for some migrant students, the reverse is occasionally true of 
complete ability tracking, i.e., tracking in all subjects. Moreover, second-generation migrants’ 
relative math achievement rises with the proportion of upper-secondary students who attend 
public schools. On balance then, while some amount of tracking on ability seems to be 
associated with improvements in migrants’ relative academic achievement, complete 
tracking—either across all subjects within schools or across the public-private school 
divide—is often associated with lower relative achievement levels for migrants. 
 We now consider how school resources and funding levels are related to migrant 
students’ relative academic achievement across the OECD. Interestingly, we find no 
significant relationship between income levels (as measured by GDP per capita) and migrant 
students’ relative achievement in OECD countries.xx Controlling for per capita income, 
however, the association between academic achievement and increased educational 
expenditure (as a percent of GDP) is often significantly weaker for migrant students than it is 
for native-born students. For example, in countries with twice the education spending (as a 
percentage of GDP) the reading achievement of second-generation migrants relative to 
similar native-born students is between 0.304 (speak the test language at home) and 0.680 (do 
not speak the test language at home) standard deviations lower than for those migrant 
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students in countries with less educational expenditure. Similarly, the link between 
achievement and higher teacher salaries is also significantly weaker for many migrant groups 
than it is for native-born students. To the extent that outcomes are better in countries that 
place greater emphasis on educational spending generally and teachers’ salaries in particular, 
this implies that migrant students benefit less from this additional expenditure. 
 The degree of accountability in an educational system has also been linked to 
educational outcomes (see Hanushek and Wößmann 2011 for a review). It is often argued 
that external examinations of students provides an important signal of students’ overall 
competency to potential employers, which can increase the incentives to invest in education. 
Teacher assessments, on the other hand, may be useful in ensuring teacher quality. We find 
that the link between external examinations and student achievement is in most cases not 
statistically different for native-born and migrant students. Where we do find significant 
effects, they are often negative, though not always. This is consistent with Schneeweis 
(2010), who also finds that external examinations have a mixed association with the 
educational integration of migrant youths. At the same time, migrant students’ achievement 
relative to their native-born peers improves when examinations are a component of the 
process for evaluating teachers. In particular, the effect of exam-based teacher evaluation on 
achievement is larger for reading (0.261 standard deviations), math (0.43 standard 
deviations), and science (0.347 standard deviations) for first-generation migrant youths who 
speak the test language at home and who arrive before the start of primary school than it is 
for native-born students. 
 Finally, migrant youths’ relative academic achievement is related to the wider social 
context. In particular, migrant students’ relative academic achievement is enhanced in 
countries with proportionately larger foreign-born populations. These countries may simply 
have more experience in successfully integrating migrant youth into the educational system. 
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While Schneeweis (2010) suggests that higher levels of income inequality reduce the 
educational integration of migrant students, we believe that the story is more nuanced. The 
relative achievement gap of first-generation migrant students arriving at younger ages 
(through age four) and speaking the test language at home is lower in countries with higher 
income inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient). The opposite is true for similar 
migrant students who arrive at older ages (11–15). 
Conclusions 
The International Organization for Migration estimates that 214 million individuals—many 
of them children—are living outside their country of birth.xxi Many more children, while born 
in the host country, are nonetheless touched by the migration experiences of their parents. 
The successful integration of these first- and second-generation migrant children is critical to 
ensuring that their skills and talents are not wasted but rather contribute positively to future 
economic growth and improved living standards. Our goal is to shed light on the institutional 
arrangements that are most effective in promoting the cognitive development and educational 
integration of children with a migration background. 
 We find that achievement gaps are wider for those migrant youths who arrive at 
older ages and for those who do not speak the test language at home. Both conclusions are 
consistent with the emerging literature suggesting that critical periods in children’s language 
development may result in critical periods in other competencies (Beck et al. 2012; Corak 
2012). We also find that educational systems do not work equally well for native-born and 
migrant students, or indeed for all groups of migrant students. Certain institutional 
arrangements, for example, earlier school starting ages, appear to reduce the relative 
achievement gap for some migrant students while leaving unaffected or exacerbating the 
relative achievement gap of others. Other arrangements, such as tracking on ability, are 
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beneficial for migrant students when implemented in a limited way, but become detrimental 
when implemented across the board. Finally, what works for native-born students does not 
always work for students with a migration background. In particular, migrant students’ 
achievement relative to their native-born peers falls as proportionately more funding is 
devoted to educational spending generally and teachers’ salaries in particular, but improves 
when examination is a component of the process for evaluating teachers. These results are 
particularly striking given that our country-specific fixed effects allow us to account for the 
multitude of ways that OECD countries differ from one another.  
  These results lead to a number of important conclusions. First, the relationship 
between specific institutional arrangements and migrant youths’ relative achievement at age 
15 depends in complex ways on the age at which those youths migrated. In effect, the 
institutional arrangements that benefit those arriving at younger ages may not provide the 
same benefits to those arriving at older ages. This implies that we need to know more about 
what works and why in order to design educational institutions that are sufficiently flexible. 
Second, the disparity in results between migrant youths who do and do not speak the 
language at home implies that the effectiveness of particular institutional arrangements may 
be sensitive to students’ underlying language abilities. This is perhaps not surprising given 
the critical role of language in supporting learning across all domains. It does, however, pose 
real challenges for educators as they attempt to target interventions and resources toward the 
migrant students who need them most. Finally, one might expect that the academic 
achievement of second-generation migrant youths who speak the test language at home 
would be no different to that of their native-born peers. This is not always the case, however. 
Having migrant parents appears to pose additional challenges for second-generation youths 
who are not associated with their own personal migration experience or with their parents’ 
educational attainment, their family background, or the language spoken at home. This raises 
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the possibility that the way that migrant parents interact with and access their children’s 
schools may be fundamentally different from otherwise similar native-born parents. 
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i See the following for analyses of cross-country differences in the nativity gap in cognitive 
test scores: Dronkers (2010); Dustmann et al. (2011); Entorf (2005); Fossati (2010); Levels 
and Dronkers (2008); Schneeweis (2010); Schnepf (2007; 2008). 
ii The nativity gap refers to the difference in mean test scores for native-born and immigrant 
children. 
iii The language of the PISA test is typically the language of instruction of the school. 
iv See also Hanushek and Wößmann (2011) for a review of studies assessing international 
differences in educational achievement. 
v The tertiary education sector encompasses all post-secondary education including 
universities and vocational education institutions. 
vi Bleakley and Chin (2010) exploit the fact that children learn languages more easily than 
adults to construct an instrument for language proficiency based on child immigrants’ age at 
arrival. This instrument produces arguably exogenous variation in language proficiency 
because children do not choose the timing of their own immigration. The authors use 
instrumental variables estimation and find a significant positive effect of English proficiency 
on the adult wages of individuals who migrated to the United States as children. 
vii In fact, Schneeweis (2010) finds that immigrant children in English-speaking countries 
have higher math and science test scores than do otherwise similar native-born children. 
viii Much of the background information in this section is taken from the PISA website at 
http://www.pisa.oecd.org. 
ix In each cycle, a two-stage stratified sampling design is used. A random sample of schools is 
selected and then a random selection of students is chosen from each school. 
x In particular, PISA also includes developing countries, such as Indonesia, and former 
socialist countries, such as Albania. 
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xi This figure also includes a very small number of individuals who arrived at age 16 in the 
country of the exam and hence essentially took the exam immediately after arriving. 
xii Achievement gaps are substantially narrower when we do not control for country-specific 
fixed effects. This suggests that migrant youth are disproportionately located in countries 
where overall achievement in reading, math, and science is higher. 
xiii The exceptions are that reading and math achievement gaps are small and marginally 
significant for: (1) first-generation immigrants arriving between the ages of five and 10 and 
speaking the test language at home; and (2) second-generation migrants not speaking the test 
language at home. Second-generation migrants not speaking the test language at home also 
experience a small and marginally significant gap in science achievement. 
xiv The exception is that there continues to be a small and marginally significant gap in math 
achievement among second-generation immigrants speaking the test language at home. 
xv The exception is that starting school at age five or younger (rather than at age six) is 
associated with a small additional reading penalty (0.265 standard deviations) for first-
generation migrant children arriving at age four or younger who speak the test language at 
home in comparison to the same effect for their native-born peers (see Table 4). 
xvi Schneeweis (2010) finds that migrant students' relative academic achievement in math and 
science would improve with some expansion in annual school hours. 
xvii In Germany, for example, migrant children are on less favorable education tracks and 
have increased difficulty in accessing vocational training (Frick and Wagner 2000; Gang and 
Zimmerman 2000). 
xviii Earlier (versus later) tracking is associated with an improvement in second-generation 
migrant students’ science achievement relative to their native-born peers (see Table 6). 
xix Schneeweis (2010) finds, however, that the availability of enrichment classes is associated 
with lower relative math achievement for migrant students as a whole. 
35 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
xx Schneeweis (2010) finds a similar result in models that include country-specific effects. 
xxi This represents 3.1 percent of the world's population. See http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/ 
about-migration/facts-and-figures/lang/en#. 
	  
	   	  
 
Test Lang Foreign Lang Test Lang Foreign Lang
Australia 57.7% 7.5% 4.7% 26.2% 3.9% 13,872
Austria 78.1% 2.6% 2.8% 9.9% 6.6% 6,386
Belgium 73.9% 3.6% 3.2% 13.5% 5.8% 7,955
Canada 64.5% 4.5% 6.8% 18.9% 5.2% 22,265
Chile 98.1% 0.6% 0.0% 1.1% 0.1% 5,475
Czech Republic 91.5% 0.5% 0.6% 7.1% 0.4% 5,974
Denmark 83.5% 2.0% 1.6% 10.5% 2.4% 5,698
Estonia 80.9% 1.0% 0.2% 16.5% 1.4% 4,641
Finland 92.9% 0.6% 1.4% 4.1% 1.0% 5,705
France 74.4% 2.1% 1.8% 18.2% 3.6% 4,202
Germany 74.7% 3.0% 3.5% 13.3% 5.4% 4,345
Greece 82.4% 4.3% 2.9% 9.8% 0.6% 4,829
Hungary 95.1% 1.3% 0.1% 3.3% 0.1% 4,543
Iceland 89.9% 1.1% 2.0% 6.3% 0.7% 3,451
Ireland 74.9% 7.7% 3.6% 13.4% 0.5% 3,605
Israel 66.4% 2.9% 4.4% 22.9% 3.3% 5,404
Italy 88.4% 2.0% 2.7% 5.9% 1.0% 30,257
Japan 98.9% 0.1% 0.1% 0.9% 0.0% 6,047
Korea 99.7% 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 4,924
Luxembourg 43.1% 7.1% 10.3% 12.4% 27.1% 4,439
Mexico 96.6% 0.9% 0.2% 2.2% 0.1% 36,829
Netherlands 80.1% 1.7% 2.2% 13.2% 2.8% 4,644
New Zealand 59.1% 10.3% 8.8% 18.1% 3.7% 4,481
Norway 84.9% 1.0% 3.1% 7.7% 3.3% 4,555
Poland 99.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 4,818
Portugal 80.5% 3.1% 1.0% 15.1% 0.3% 5,580
Slovak Republic 94.1% 0.5% 0.1% 5.0% 0.3% 4,512
Slovenia 83.6% 0.7% 1.0% 11.2% 3.5% 6,016
Spain 84.9% 5.5% 3.6% 4.6% 1.5% 25,120
Sweden 77.5% 1.9% 2.5% 13.6% 4.4% 4,436
Switzerland 58.3% 5.1% 4.3% 24.2% 8.1% 11,391
Turkey 98.1% 0.2% 0.1% 1.5% 0.0% 4,844
United Kingdom 80.9% 2.6% 3.1% 11.3% 2.1% 11,733
United States 73.1% 2.1% 4.8% 12.3% 7.5% 5,080
Table 1: Nativity Distribution by Country
Native-Born Sample Size
Notes: All results are weighted using the provided student weights. 
1st Generation 2nd Generation
 Read Math Scie Read Math Scie Read Math Scie Read Math Scie Read Math Scie
Overall 495 492 501 -10 -14 -13 -27 -20 -30 3 -2 -3 -25 -30 -33
Australia 511 510 525 20 12 12 -7 8 -11 17 14 14 12 28 6
Austria 482 508 509 -82 -66 -89 -87 -70 -95 -24 -30 -31 -53 -55 -75
Belgium 525 536 528 -38 -52 -53 -79 -82 -85 -26 -35 -34 -76 -79 -77
Canada 526 530 534 1 -11 -8 -10 -4 -15 6 -4 -4 -9 -4 -21
Chile 451 423 449 -7 -24 -22 13 16 13 -18 -43 -25
Czech Republic 480 495 502 -8 -4 -1 8 6 9 -17 -19 -20 17 14 -2
Denmark 501 511 508 -37 -50 -41 -75 -74 -94 -15 -25 -24 -58 -62 -85
Estonia 508 519 535 -13 -11 -17 -60 -71 -69 -30 -33 -34 -35 -32 -41
Finland 539 543 557 -45 -42 -50 -85 -62 -90 -15 -21 -20 -51 -41 -60
France 506 509 510 -58 -55 -61 -67 -63 -65 -24 -32 -30 -72 -73 -77
Germany 515 530 542 -53 -51 -59 -58 -51 -72 -28 -34 -42 -60 -64 -87
Greece 489 471 475 -37 -28 -29 -70 -63 -59 -5 -2 -4 -24 -24 -22
Hungary 494 490 502 4 6 2 -15 -24 21 31 27 29 85 43 67
Iceland 504 510 498 -45 -49 -48 -63 -43 -49 -7 -12 -12 -50 -30 -35
Ireland 499 489 509 1 -2 5 -49 -27 -31 14 13 19 -10 -26 -49
Israel 473 445 453 -18 -10 -26 5 12 0 23 22 23 47 36 43
Italy 491 487 494 -57 -45 -64 -77 -64 -75 -2 -2 -2 -41 -27 -33
Japan 521 530 541 35 54 8 -34 8 -60 -38 -38 -37 -16 -20 -11
Korea 540 547 539 -6 -11 -18 -28 -40 -43
Luxembourg 500 516 515 -29 -30 -31 -57 -57 -67 -56 -51 -62 -41 -43 -48
Mexico 430 423 420 -93 -81 -62 -109 -92 -75 -54 -54 -41 -85 -58 -44
Netherlands 516 535 533 -35 -38 -48 -42 -56 -77 -21 -30 -31 -52 -62 -72
New Zealand 522 521 537 31 25 21 -30 -17 -34 11 4 5 -53 -46 -63
Norway 508 503 506 5 4 1 -64 -65 -78 -4 -4 -7 -45 -47 -62
Poland 502 496 510 70 165 137 12 -8 -10
Portugal 500 497 502 -26 -30 -25 -24 -4 -16 9 6 9 -50 -46 -60
Slovak Republic 479 498 492 -15 -11 -7 -8 -38 -47 -5 -4 -5 -50 -57 -52
Slovenia 489 508 519 -61 -73 -61 -71 -89 -80 -16 -21 -24 -45 -46 -65
Spain 488 491 495 -45 -59 -49 -69 -63 -69 5 -3 2 -10 -16 -12
Sweden 507 504 506 -43 -44 -51 -84 -62 -87 -12 -18 -19 -59 -58 -70
Switzerland 512 552 534 -31 -51 -40 -74 -92 -91 -7 -20 -21 -43 -59 -63
Turkey 465 446 455 63 97 62 -78 -53 -55 36 49 33 5 28 -5
United Kingdom 498 496 518 -9 -15 -2 -44 -33 -38 7 3 4 -27 -19 -36
United States 505 494 510 13 4 0 -26 -19 -33 -1 -8 -13 -32 -39 -41
Observations
Notes: All results are weighted using the provided student weights. The figures for migrant groups are
relative to those for the native-born in the same country.
Table 2: Average Test Scores by Nativity and Country
Native-Born
Test Language
238,023 7,696 7,122 27,422 7,793
1st Generation
Foreign Lang
2nd Generation
Test Language Foreign Lang
	  
	   	  
Age at Arrival Age 0-4 Age 5-10 Age 11-15 Age 0-4 Age 5-10 Age 11-15 Test Language Foreign Language
Reading -0.120* -0.220*** -0.310*** -0.225*** -0.331*** -0.747*** -0.0749*** -0.394***
(0.068) (0.066) (0.078) (0.074) (0.059) (0.066) (0.027) (0.044)
Math -0.185*** -0.237*** -0.332*** -0.195*** -0.272*** -0.553*** -0.131*** -0.437***
(0.057) (0.065) (0.070) (0.064) (0.056) (0.065) (0.026) (0.041)
Science -0.165** -0.244*** -0.375*** -0.302*** -0.392*** -0.700*** -0.149*** -0.485***
(0.066) (0.064) (0.076) (0.069) (0.059) (0.067) (0.027) (0.044)
Reading -0.052 -0.126* -0.242*** 0.009 -0.070 -0.564*** 0.001 -0.0814*
(0.064) (0.066) (0.074) (0.072) (0.052) (0.056) (0.025) (0.046)
Math -0.085 -0.105* -0.223*** 0.084 0.036 -0.327*** -0.036 -0.0839**
(0.054) (0.063) (0.066) (0.063) (0.048) (0.055) (0.023) (0.042)
Science -0.030 -0.072 -0.225*** 0.020 -0.041 -0.427*** -0.034 -0.0929**
(0.062) (0.064) (0.071) (0.067) (0.052) (0.057) (0.025) (0.045)
Reading -0.024 -0.051 -0.075 0.062 0.042 -0.402*** -0.001 -0.046
(0.052) (0.053) (0.066) (0.069) (0.050) (0.054) (0.022) (0.042)
Math -0.047 -0.018 -0.041 0.146** 0.153*** -0.142*** -0.0333* -0.044
(0.044) (0.050) (0.057) (0.058) (0.047) (0.050) (0.019) (0.038)
Science 0.000 0.005 -0.055 0.072 0.068 -0.262*** -0.033 -0.058
(0.050) (0.052) (0.062) (0.065) (0.051) (0.055) (0.021) (0.042)
Observations
B) Controlling for Parental Education and Country FEs - R-Squared: Reading = 0.210, Math = 0.232, Science = 0.227
C) Controlling for Parental Education, Socioeconomic Status and Child Resources, and Country FEs - R-Squared: Reading = 0.365, Math = 0.383, Science = 0.376
2nd Generation
Notes: All regressions include controls for child age, gender and country fixed effects. The second panel adds controls for parent's highest years of education,
whether this is missing, and whether any parent was born in the test country. The third panel adds extensive controls for parental socioeconomics status and
educational investments. Robust standard errors that account for school (and country) level correlation in errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Overall Migrant Test Score Gap in OECD Countries
1st Generation - Test Language Spoken at Home
288,056
1st Generation - Foreign Language Spoken at Home
A) Controlling for Country Fixed Effects - R-Squared: Reading = 0.133, Math = 0.155, Science = 0.151
	  Age at Arrival Age 0-4 Age 5-10 Age 11-15 Age 0-4 Age 5-10 Age 11-15 Test Lang Foreign Lang
Log Real GDP Per Capita (PPP) 0.070 0.146 0.258 0.114 0.342* 0.253 0.032 0.056
(0.222) (0.221) (0.275) (0.233) (0.178) (0.255) (0.082) (0.151)
Gini Coefficient on Income -2.148** 0.039 3.680** 0.648 0.254 -0.138 0.341 0.046
(0.950) (1.031) (1.519) (0.934) (0.775) (1.110) (0.339) (0.632)
Log Percent Foreign-born 0.0994** 0.037 0.204** 0.300*** 0.121* 0.085 0.144*** 0.228***
(0.039) (0.082) (0.094) (0.051) (0.063) (0.099) (0.019) (0.055)
School Starting Age <=5 -0.265* -0.090 -0.021 -0.124 -0.153 0.252 -0.080 -0.039
(0.137) (0.186) (0.299) (0.212) (0.191) (0.196) (0.067) (0.157)
School Starting Age =7 -0.142* 0.035 0.225* -0.296** -0.207** -0.364*** 0.020 -0.033
(0.081) (0.110) (0.126) (0.122) (0.089) (0.112) (0.035) (0.072)
Years of Compulsory School 0.027 -0.013 0.020 0.033 -0.073 -0.003 0.038 0.010
(0.070) (0.096) (0.167) (0.093) (0.077) (0.107) (0.031) (0.061)
Log Educational Expenditure (% GDP) -0.539*** -0.927*** -0.224 0.038 -0.706*** -0.194 -0.304*** -0.680***
(0.177) (0.248) (0.244) (0.273) (0.234) (0.225) (0.103) (0.195)
Log Percent Upper Secondary Public -0.057 -0.012 -0.113 0.438 0.204 0.226 0.047 0.174
(0.152) (0.183) (0.274) (0.288) (0.195) (0.226) (0.068) (0.163)
Log (Teacher's Salaries / GDP PC) 0.021 -0.399** -0.398 -0.173 -0.103 -0.501** -0.074 -0.247**
(0.111) (0.172) (0.274) (0.171) (0.163) (0.235) (0.050) (0.099)
Age of First Selection 0.0485*** 0.0399** 0.020 0.019 0.009 0.0617*** 0.006 0.017
(0.017) (0.018) (0.030) (0.020) (0.015) (0.022) (0.008) (0.014)
External Examination 0.013 -0.025 -0.175 -0.190* 0.162 -0.062 0.030 0.031
(0.088) (0.120) (0.163) (0.107) (0.120) (0.130) (0.032) (0.073)
Some Ability Grouping 0.262 0.663*** 0.514* -0.001 0.269 0.096 0.126* 0.185
(0.177) (0.209) (0.294) (0.209) (0.231) (0.249) (0.070) (0.149)
Ability Grouping for All Subjects 0.110 0.309 -0.912 0.098 -0.122 1.331** -0.061 0.151
(0.395) (0.387) (0.689) (0.403) (0.352) (0.531) (0.140) (0.250)
Teachers Evaluated Based on Exams 0.261* -0.234 -0.040 0.111 0.132 0.107 0.120** 0.174*
(0.155) (0.145) (0.224) (0.220) (0.133) (0.169) (0.055) (0.104)
Observations 288,056
Notes: All regressions include controls for country fixed effects, child age and gender, parent's highest years of education, whether this is missing, and whether any parent
was born in the test country and extensive controls for parental socioeconomics status and educational investments. The school starting age variables are relative to the
excluded group of Starting Age =6. Robust standard errors that account for school (and country) level correlation in errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Relationship between Country-Level Policies and Migrant Reading Test Score Gap in OECD Countries
1st Gen - Test Language Spoken at Home 1st Gen - Foreign Language Spoken at Home 2nd Generation
	  Age at Arrival Age 0-4 Age 5-10 Age 11-15 Age 0-4 Age 5-10 Age 11-15 Test Lang Foreign Lang
Log Real GDP Per Capita (PPP) -0.080 0.234 0.247 0.194 0.129 0.354 0.012 -0.112
(0.191) (0.212) (0.231) (0.206) (0.179) (0.253) (0.078) (0.140)
Gini Coefficient on Income -2.135** 0.920 3.198** 1.064 0.425 -0.198 0.328 -0.271
(0.874) (1.024) (1.352) (0.880) (0.767) (1.090) (0.327) (0.595)
Log Percent Foreign-born 0.054 -0.001 0.222** 0.170*** 0.096 0.065 0.123*** 0.167***
(0.036) (0.071) (0.101) (0.046) (0.059) (0.101) (0.019) (0.050)
School Starting Age <=5 -0.041 -0.202 -0.047 -0.113 -0.215 0.069 -0.019 0.226
(0.126) (0.185) (0.313) (0.202) (0.188) (0.186) (0.072) (0.157)
School Starting Age =7 -0.151 0.114 0.002 -0.185 -0.225** -0.297*** 0.008 -0.060
(0.092) (0.135) (0.142) (0.126) (0.094) (0.109) (0.040) (0.077)
Years of Compulsory School -0.029 -0.021 0.346* 0.021 -0.022 0.041 0.028 -0.047
(0.077) (0.120) (0.197) (0.089) (0.072) (0.104) (0.037) (0.063)
Log Educational Expenditure (% GDP) -0.713*** -1.045*** 0.154 -0.281 -0.712*** -0.370 -0.455*** -0.796***
(0.189) (0.272) (0.262) (0.265) (0.240) (0.234) (0.112) (0.212)
Log Percent Upper Secondary Public 0.192 0.204 0.399 0.418 0.288 0.407** 0.161** 0.348**
(0.145) (0.171) (0.287) (0.257) (0.186) (0.203) (0.069) (0.149)
Log (Teacher's Salaries / GDP PC) -0.082 -0.224 -0.716** -0.136 -0.113 -0.341 -0.075 -0.347***
(0.108) (0.179) (0.281) (0.167) (0.165) (0.222) (0.052) (0.104)
Age of First Selection 0.0535*** 0.021 -0.008 0.017 0.005 0.0481** 0.009 0.016
(0.017) (0.021) (0.034) (0.021) (0.016) (0.020) (0.008) (0.014)
External Examination 0.006 0.077 -0.416** -0.005 0.175* -0.050 0.008 0.043
(0.091) (0.120) (0.168) (0.100) (0.100) (0.128) (0.034) (0.071)
Some Ability Grouping 0.079 0.601*** 0.014 0.190 0.500*** 0.186 0.091 0.198
(0.178) (0.210) (0.301) (0.192) (0.186) (0.241) (0.072) (0.146)
Ability Grouping for All Subjects 0.195 -0.691* -1.663** -0.244 -0.586* -0.160 -0.120 0.126
(0.383) (0.416) (0.681) (0.390) (0.339) (0.466) (0.143) (0.243)
Teachers Evaluated Based on Exams 0.343** -0.068 0.445** 0.004 0.026 0.258* 0.184*** 0.008
(0.149) (0.157) (0.223) (0.196) (0.127) (0.155) (0.056) (0.099)
Observations
Notes: All regressions include controls for country fixed effects, child age and gender, parent's highest years of education, whether this is missing, and whether any parent was
born in the test country and extensive controls for parental socioeconomics status and educational investments. The school starting age variables are relative to the excluded
group of Starting Age =6. Robust standard errors that account for school (and country) level correlation in errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Relationship between Country-Level Policies and Migrant Math Test Score Gap in OECD Countries
1st Gen - Test Language Spoken at Home 1st Gen - Foreign Language Spoken at Home 2nd Generation
288,056
Age at Arrival Age 0-4 Age 5-10 Age 11-15 Age 0-4 Age 5-10 Age 11-15 Test Lang Foreign Lang
Log Real GDP Per Capita (PPP) -0.091 0.013 0.165 -0.128 -0.063 0.045 -0.129 -0.179
(0.220) (0.207) (0.268) (0.231) (0.186) (0.294) (0.083) (0.141)
Gini Coefficient on Income -2.298** 1.066 3.372** 2.104** 0.639 1.033 0.142 0.622
(0.928) (0.981) (1.495) (0.943) (0.792) (1.234) (0.338) (0.563)
Log Percent Foreign-born 0.008 0.031 0.227*** 0.222*** 0.104 0.107 0.105*** 0.183***
(0.038) (0.061) (0.084) (0.046) (0.064) (0.122) (0.018) (0.045)
School Starting Age <=5 -0.093 0.069 0.133 -0.079 -0.213 0.226 0.025 0.041
(0.134) (0.185) (0.290) (0.220) (0.194) (0.210) (0.068) (0.157)
School Starting Age =7 -0.193** 0.101 0.274** -0.308** -0.185* -0.173 -0.055 -0.066
(0.084) (0.117) (0.122) (0.132) (0.097) (0.115) (0.035) (0.076)
Years of Compulsory School 0.048 -0.039 0.005 0.100 0.003 0.022 0.033 -0.023
(0.069) (0.100) (0.147) (0.091) (0.079) (0.124) (0.032) (0.062)
Log Educational Expenditure (% GDP) -0.399** -0.752*** -0.082 0.123 -0.749*** -0.419 -0.185* -0.721***
(0.175) (0.217) (0.227) (0.282) (0.235) (0.264) (0.099) (0.198)
Log Percent Upper Secondary Public -0.001 0.227 0.002 0.379 0.090 0.052 0.135** 0.165
(0.141) (0.164) (0.260) (0.277) (0.196) (0.231) (0.069) (0.158)
Log (Teacher's Salaries / GDP PC) -0.066 -0.247 -0.122 -0.324* -0.267 -0.559** -0.0957* -0.369***
(0.110) (0.174) (0.283) (0.175) (0.170) (0.258) (0.050) (0.105)
Age of First Selection 0.0587*** 0.0327* -0.028 0.034 0.005 0.0442** 0.0178** 0.0419***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.029) (0.023) (0.017) (0.021) (0.008) (0.013)
External Examination -0.072 -0.067 -0.326** -0.110 0.133 -0.126 0.001 -0.007
(0.084) (0.112) (0.166) (0.096) (0.112) (0.146) (0.031) (0.071)
Some Ability Grouping 0.221 0.382* 0.453 -0.035 0.448** -0.038 0.096 0.093
(0.168) (0.200) (0.287) (0.190) (0.218) (0.275) (0.069) (0.144)
Ability Grouping for All Subjects 0.393 -0.249 -1.468** 0.282 -0.375 0.117 0.118 0.383
(0.373) (0.406) (0.669) (0.397) (0.382) (0.503) (0.151) (0.253)
Teachers Evaluated Based on Exams 0.347** -0.015 0.129 -0.286 0.094 0.223 0.0987* 0.070
(0.156) (0.146) (0.209) (0.219) (0.139) (0.185) (0.057) (0.115)
Observations
Notes: All regressions include controls for country fixed effects, child age and gender, parent's highest years of education, whether this is missing, and whether any parent
was born in the test country and extensive controls for parental socioeconomics status and educational investments. The school starting age variables are relative to the
excluded group of Starting Age =6. Robust standard errors that account for school (and country) level correlation in errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: Relationship between Country-Level Policies and Migrant Science Test Score Gap in OECD Countries
1st Gen - Test Language Spoken at Home 1st Gen - Foreign Language Spoken at Home 2nd Generation
288,056
	  Mean Std. Dev. 25th Pctile Median 75th Pctile
Real GDP Per Capita (PPP) 33,899 13,068 27,036 34,911 38,818
Gini Coefficient on Income 0.333 0.068 0.283 0.329 0.360
Proportion Foreign-born 0.104 0.090 0.031 0.085 0.138
School Starting Age <=5 0.118
School Starting Age =6 0.676
School Starting Age =7 0.206
Years of Compulsory School 12.41 0.609 12.00 12.00 13.00
Educational Expenditure (% GDP) 0.051 0.011 0.043 0.051 0.057
Percent Upper Secondary Public 0.834 0.154 0.775 0.875 0.942
Teacher's Salaries / GDP Per Capita 1.094 0.346 0.871 1.069 1.265
Age of First Selection 13.91 2.021 12.00 15.00 16.00
External Examination 0.619
No Ability Grouping 0.348 0.241 0.179 0.296 0.531
Some Ability Grouping 0.520 0.245 0.362 0.453 0.749
Ability Grouping for All Subjects 0.132 0.123 0.049 0.090 0.186
Teachers Evaluated Based on Exams 0.456 0.286 0.249 0.396 0.753
Observations
Real GDP Per Capita (PPP) 33,697 11,642 27,641 35,189 47,335
Gini Coefficient on Income 0.370 0.077 0.316 0.360 0.408
Proportion Foreign-born 0.081 0.063 0.016 0.090 0.128
School Starting Age <=5 0.079
School Starting Age =6 0.852
School Starting Age =7 0.069
Years of Compulsory School 12.18 0.513 12.00 12.00 12.00
Educational Expenditure (% GDP) 0.048 0.008 0.043 0.049 0.055
Percent Upper Secondary Public 0.817 0.145 0.692 0.888 0.914
Teacher's Salaries / GDP Per Capita 1.189 0.332 0.930 1.016 1.383
Age of First Selection 14.19 1.994 12.00 15.00 16.00
External Examination 0.509
No Ability Grouping 0.322 0.250 0.127 0.281 0.525
Some Ability Grouping 0.556 0.260 0.391 0.459 0.799
Ability Grouping for All Subjects 0.122 0.093 0.074 0.081 0.186
Teachers Evaluated Based on Exams 0.488 0.243 0.285 0.416 0.754
Observations
Appendix Table 1: Distribution of Country-Level Policies across OECD Countries
34
Notes: See the paper for further details on how each variable is defined. Student weights provided by
PISA are used in panel B.
A) Each Country Given Equal Weight
B) Weighted by Eligible PISA Population of Each Country
288,056
